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ABSTRACT
Fingerprinting of audio-visual content using digital watermarks is
an effective means of determining the originators of unauthorized
copies and ﬁghting piracy in digital distribution networks. In par-
ticular, watermarks embedded within the content help trace the
traitor responsible for the piracy. A group of users may, however,
collude and collectively escape identiﬁcation by creating an aver-
age of their individually watermarked copies that appears unwa-
termarked. We propose a novel collusion-resilience mechanism,
wherein the host signal is warped randomly prior to watermarking.
As each copy undergoes a distinctive warp, collusion through aver-
aging either yields low-quality results or requires substantial com-
putational resources to undo random warps. The proposed method
is independent of the watermarking scheme used and does not im-
pose any restrictions on the watermark signal that are required by
some collusion resistant watermarking schemes. We demonstrate
the effectiveness of this approach on digital images.
1. INTRODUCTION
The term ﬁngerprinting or traitor tracing refers to addition of a
unique mark on each copy of distributed content. If and when
an unauthorized copy of the ﬁngerprinted content is made and
distributed, the mark (ﬁngerprint) embedded in the leaked copy
uniquely identiﬁes the traitor. Historically, ﬁngerprinting has been
mostly utilized for secret documents. The small number of users
in traditional settings and relatively high value of the documents
have allowed for manual embedding and detection of ﬁngerprints,
typically by making minor, but distinct, edits to the document. In
large scale digital distribution networks, however, manual editing
is prohibitive .
Digital watermarking [1,2] offers an efﬁcient method for au-
tomatic ﬁngerprinting of content for distribution over large net-
works. Typically, the digital watermark (ﬁngerprint) is a pseudo-
noise pattern representing the identity of the user and it is super-
imposed on the host signal—the content to be distributed, e.g. the
image. Later, when an unauthorized copy is found, the presence
of a particular watermark pattern reveals the identity of the traitor
who has compromised the content.
One particular strategy for the traitors to escape identiﬁcation
upon unauthorized distribution is working collectively in order to
disable the watermark. In particular, a group of traitorscollude and
use each of their ﬁngerprinted copies to obtain a copy within which
the ﬁngerprint patterns cannot be detected reliably. Collusion often
involves averaging several distributed copies and results in a high-
quality untraceable copy.
Collusion-secure watermarks proposed earlier [3, 4] impose
restrictions on the construction of the watermark pattern to thwart
collusion attacks. In these algorithms, the watermark patterns—
or payloads—are partially correlated and any subset of these pat-
terns bears a static component. This static component not only
survives the averaging attack, but also uniquely identiﬁes a partic-
ular subset of watermarks that were averaged—revealing the group
of traitors. Nevertheless, security against collusion often comes in
the expense of the capacity and/or robustness of the original wa-
termarking algorithm [4, 5] and its performance degrades as the
number of traitors increases.
An alternative approach to collusion-resilient ﬁngerprinting is
proposed here. The method imposes no restrictions on the water-
mark pattern and may therefore be used in conjunction with any
watermarking method. In contrast with schemes that detect collu-
sion and identify colluders, the proposed scheme is aimed at pre-
empting collusion by preventing traitors from obtaining a high-
quality copy through collusion. In our approach, the geometry of
the host-signal is randomly and imperceptibly distorted prior to
watermark addition and distribution. If a group of users collude
and average multiple distinctively warped copies of the content,
the mis-registration, i.e. the mismatch between the underlying ge-
ometries, makes the resulting averaged version inferior in quality.
2. FINGERPRINTING AND COLLUSION ATTACK
We present a brief overview of the use of digital watermarking for
ﬁngerprinting purposes and describe the collusion attack. The wa-
termarking scheme described here is a speciﬁc method which is
based on additive spread-spectrum techniques. Alternative water-
marking methods, such as quantization based algorithms, may be
also used for ﬁngerprinting purposes. In general, both the collu-
sion attack presented in this section and the solution proposed in
the next section are valid, regardless of the selected watermarking
method.
Let us assume that the content which will be distributed is a
continuous signal, such as an audio recording. We refer to this
signal, upon which a digital ﬁngerprint will be imposed, as the
host signal and denote it by S. The unique ﬁngerprint (watermark)
which is unique to a particular user is denoted by Wi, where sub-
script i is linked to the identity of that user. The watermarking pro-
cedure superimposes the watermark pattern Wi on the host signal
and yields the ﬁngerprinted signal Si.
Si = S + Wi (1)
for all i 2 f1;:::;Ng, where N is the total number of users.
When an unauthorized copy of the host signal Su is found, the
presence of the particular watermark is checked using a correlation
0-7803-7750-8/03/$17.00 ©2003 IEEE. ICIP 2003detector. That is Wi is present in the signal if
hSu;Wii > Threshold (2)
It is desirable to design watermark patterns Wi such that they are
uncorrelated with the host signal and with each other. If Su = Si,
the correlation is randomly distributed around jjWijj and around
zero otherwise. The Threshold, determines the trade-off between
the false positives and misses.
To escape identiﬁcation and prevent detection of watermark
patterns, a group of users may obtain an average signal using their
individually watermarked copies. For K colluding users, the aver-
age signal is
Savg =
1
K
K X
i=1
Si = S +
1
K
K X
i=1
Wi (3)
It should be noted that the correlation between the average sig-
nal Savg and a particular watermark pattern Wj, hSavg;Wji de-
creases linearly withK, the number of copies used. In general, it is
possible to prevent detection by forcing the correlation value under
the threshold using more and more copies. Moreover, the quality
of the of the averaged signal is often superior when compared with
the ﬁngerprinted signal,
d(Savg;S) < d(Si;S) (4)
where d(;) = jj     jj is the Euclidean distance.
3. COLLUSION-RESILIENCE WITH RANDOM
PRE-WARPING
Consider a set of warping functions  such that for all func-
tions i() 2 , i(S) is perceptually identical to S, but
the Euclidean distance between two signals is signiﬁcantly large
(d(i(S);S) >> 1). We further require that the Euclidean dis-
tance between different warped versions of the same signal is
large, i.e. d(i(S);j(S)) >> 1 for i 6= j. The set of functions
 may be populated, for instance, by functions that correspond to
small local distortions on the geometry of the signal. In a majority
of cases, the human perceptual system is highly tolerant of such
manipulations and the overall effect is imperceptible, despite the
large mean squared error (MSE) distortion among signals. This
property has been previously exploited in Stirmark [6] where it
forms the basis of de-synchronization attacks on a number of wa-
termarking schemes. Here instead we exploit the same property to
provide collusion resilience.
3.1. Collusion-Resilience for Oblivious Watermarking
We ﬁrst discuss pre-warping for oblivious watermarking schemes,
where the watermark signal is detected without any reference to
the original host signal. Our method is based on applying a dif-
ferent, randomly selected warping function i() to the host signal
prior to addition of the watermark signal Wi. That is, the i
th wa-
termarked signal is formed as
Si = i(S) + Wi: (5)
Eqn. 5 captures a number of different cases where the present
technique may be applied. For instance, in the case of a video
stream where S is a function of 2-D spatial coordinates x, y and
time t, the geometric warping is applicable in the 3-D spatio-
temporal space (x;y;t) and Eqn. 5 may be written as
Si(x;y;t) = S(x
0;y
0;t
0) + Wi (6)
x
0 = 
x
i (x;y;t); y
0 = 
y
i (x;y;t); t
0 = 
t
i(x;y;t) (7)
The requirement of imperceptible visual distortion can then be im-
posed as a smoothness requirement on the 3-D coordinate trans-
formation in Eqn. 7.
Watermark detection is performed on a suspected copy Su,
through a correlation detector as earlier (Eqn. 2). As the warped
host signal bears statistical characteristics similar to the original
host signal, performance of the detection is not affected by the
warping.
As in the earlier scheme, several users may try and collude
and obtain an average host signal in order to thwart the watermark.
The average signal from a collusion attack by K users is given by
Savg =
1
K
K X
i=1
Si =
1
K
K X
i=1
i(S) +
1
K
K X
i=1
Wi (8)
Note that by comparing the averaged watermark terms in Eqn. 8
and Eqn. 3, we can see that the averaging attack still impairs the
watermark detection to the same degree as the prior schemes: the
correlation value decreases linearly with the number of copies av-
eraged. However, if we compare the corresponding “signal” terms
in Eqn. 8 and Eqn. 3 one can see a very signiﬁcant difference. The
signal terms averaged in Eqn. 3 are identical and therefore cause
no degradation of the signal, whereas due to the warping the signal
terms averaged in Eqn. 8 are different and this typically produces
an averaged copy often of signiﬁcantly inferior quality. Averaging
of the differently warped images produces several artifacts in the
signal (d(Savg;S) >> 1) which are typically both perceptually
signiﬁcant and disturbing. For instance, if the host signal is a dig-
ital image the average appears to have multiple ghost images or it
is a blurred version. In either case, the colluded copy is a rather
low quality version.
Note that the proposed scheme does not guarantee absolute se-
curity against collusion. Given a number of copies, it is possible
to undo the warping to align all signals to a common geometry
and then average the registered copies. This in effect undoes the
individual warping operations i. Nonetheless, this requires sig-
niﬁcant additional effort on the part of the colluders in terms of
computation time and custom software.
3.2. Collusion-Resilience for Non-Oblivious Watermarking
The method described above can also be used with non-oblivious
watermarks, which utilize the original signal during detection. In
non-oblivious watermarking, the warping can be performed either
before or after the addition of the watermark. If the warping is ap-
plied prior to watermarking, the warped unwatermarked signal has
to be present at the decoder. This can be achieved either by storing
the warped signals or the warping parameters along with the orig-
inal signal. On the other hand, if the warping is applied after wa-
termarking, it has to be undone before detection to prevent loss of
synchronization. Although, undoing random geometric manipula-
tions is challenging, this process can be simpliﬁed signiﬁcantly by
utilizing a pre-determined subset of all possible warping param-
eters. Unless the watermarked signal is warped again by a third
party, detector performs a limited search in this small subset.4. IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Wedemonstrate the transparency and effectiveness of the proposed
anti-collusion algorithm on digital images. In this context, we
utilize the Stirmark tool [6] (version 3.1.79), which we use ex-
clusively to apply geometric distortions while disabling its other
attack features. A spatial domain spread-spectrum watermarking
system with minimal complexity is chosen to simplify the analy-
sis. The watermark is an additive white Gaussian pseudo-noise
with variance 
2
W. (In our experiments watermarking strength is
set to 
2
W = 9, which corresponds to 38.6 dB embedding distor-
tion.) The detection is performed through normalized correlation
(Eqn. 10) which is preceded by Wiener ﬁltering (Eqn. 9).
^ W =

2
W
2
S + 2
W
(Su   Su) (9)
NC =
h ^ W;Wi
q
h ^ W; ^ WihW;Wi
(10)
If the watermark estimate perfectly matches the watermark,
normalized correlation equals to 1. However, the watermark es-
timate is often corrupted with noise interference from the image
^ W = Wi + N. Similarly, ^ W = Wi=K + N when K-copies
of the content are averaged. If we assume that the noise and the
watermark patterns are uncorrelated (hN;Wii = 0) and the noise-
to-watermark ratio is constant, i.e. c0 =
hN;Ni
hWi;Wii, then Eqn. 10
simpliﬁes to
NC =
1
p
1 + c0K2 : (11)
Thevisual impact ofthe proposed scheme isﬁrstdemonstrated
through an example. The original gray-scale image (800  600)
is shown in Fig. 1. Watermarked images are obtained by distort-
ing the image geometry with Stirmark (using a random seed) and
adding a key-dependent pseudo-noise watermark pattern. A repre-
sentative watermarked image is seen in Fig. 2. While the distortion
produces a rather low peak signal to noise ratio (PSNR) (31.4 dB)
with respect to the original, the perceptual quality of the image is
largely unchanged. The result of a simulated collusion averaging
attack employing two images is shown in Fig. 3. Note that the
visual quality of the image is rather poor showing clear ghosting
around the edges, despite a similar PSNR value of 30.7 dB. (The
visual quality of images can be assessed better in electronic ver-
sions compared to hard-copy prints.) The result of the collusion
attack using nine watermarked images is shown in Fig. 4. In this
case, the average image is blurred and its perceptual quality is sig-
niﬁcantly degraded (PSNR= 29.3 dB). The normalized correlation
coefﬁcients for Figs. 2, 3, 4 are 0.39, 0.26, and 0.11, respectively.
We also test the performance of the watermark with and with-
out the proposed pre-warping scheme in a set of 23 gray-scale im-
ages (size 768  512) from Kodak Photo-CD. Figures 5 and 6
summarize this performance as averaged results over all images
and for 10 iterations using different seeds for the random-number
generator. In Fig. 5, we observe that in the absence of pre-warping
the quality of colluded copy improves signiﬁcantly (up to 6 dB
over the watermarked image) with increasing number of colluders.
The corresponding curve with pre-warping is also included in the
same ﬁgure. Note however that the PSNR metric based on pixel-
wise differences is not meaningful in the presence of geometric
deformations.
Fig. 1. Original image.
Fig. 2. Image after warping by Stirmark [6] and watermark addi-
tion. The distortion is perceptually tolerable.
In Fig. 6, normalized correlation values for the classical and
proposed schemes are plotted. In addition, normalized correla-
tion values in case of collusion are estimated according to Eqn. 11
(solid line). As expected, we observe the sharp drop in the de-
tector’s response when multiple watermarked copies are averaged.
This shows that the collusion attack signiﬁcantly reduces the nor-
malized correlation, potentially limiting the capacity/robustness
of the underlying ﬁngerprinting system. Surprisingly, the pro-
posed anti-collusion feature offers an improvement in watermark
detection—in addition to the degradation in visual quality of the
colluded copy. Averaging independently warped copies of an im-
age produces a smooth (blurred) image that has a lower variance.
Consequently, the image can be ﬁltered out more effectively by
the Wiener ﬁlter. The residual noise—thus the noise-to-watermark
ratio c0—is reduced and the normalized correlation values are im-
proved with respect to the classical case. It is worth mentioning
that this improvement is an unintended consequence of the pro-
posed method in the given watermarking system and these results
cannot be generalized to other watermark embedding and detec-
tion systems.Fig. 3. Collusion result when two warped images are averaged.
Ghosting around edges is visible and disturbing.
Fig.4. Collusion result when nine (9) warped images are averaged.
The image is blurred and bears little commercial value.
5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
We have presented an alternative method for collusion-resilient
watermarking. Our approach is based on randomly and uniquely
pre-warping each copy of the host-signal prior to distribution. Hu-
man perception is quite tolerant of the geometric distortion and the
warping therefore does not signiﬁcantly affect the perceived qual-
ity of the watermarked signal. On the other hand, as the geometry
of each copy is distorted independently, a collusion attack yields a
low-quality signal. We have shown that collusion even with only
two copies results in disturbing distortions—ghost edges—and vi-
sual quality does not improve when the number of copies is in-
creased. Higher-quality collusion is only possible by undoing the
warping which requires special software and substantial computa-
tional resources. Finally, the solution does not adversely affect the
performance (capacity/robustness) of the underlying watermark-
ing scheme. The approach can either replace existing collusion
resistant watermarks or it can be applied in conjunction to identify
even traitors who choose to use the low-quality average signals.
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Fig. 5. PSNR of the colluded copy vs. number of colluders (with-
out pre- warping).
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Fig. 6. Normalized correlation vs. number of colluders (with and
without pre-warping).
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